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1. The Agony and the Esctasy is a historical novel about Michelangelo. IRVING
STONE, THE AGONY AND THE ECSTASY (1961). It was produced in 1965 as a movie
starring Charlton Heston. I read the book and watched the movie. I think the
ecstasy was Michelangelo turning a block of marble into a statue, but I am not
sure. The agony was harder to discern. Perhaps it was Michelangelo being




For many years I have been teaching Corporate Tax to law stu-
dents. 2 Like most professors, I like to think that I am helping the
students by teaching the course. I feel like I am helping them prepare
for their careers. Naturally enough, they like to think they will bene-
fit from learning a subject matter that will be of practical use to them.
But, of course, humankind does not live on bread alone. Usually, both
the students and I enjoy the course. To enjoy a course in a subject
matter (and law school for that matter), there needs to be more for the
professor than just doing a job and more for the students than just
preparing for a job. And, in Corporate Tax, usually there is. Most of
us, professors and students, enjoy the challenge of attempting to
master, analyze, resolve, apply, and, sometimes, just comprehend
complex statutory systems and factual problems. Otherwise, Corpo-
rate Tax would be drudgery. For us, it is not. As one corporate tax
lawyer says, "corporate tax can be-dare I say it?-fun."3
Corporate tax law is comprised basically of a group of mini-sys-
tems. For example, § 3514 and related sections provide a system for
incorporations. Section 3315 and related sections provide a system for
liquidations. Section 3686 and related sections provide a system for
acquisitions and reorganizations. And so on. Some of these regimes
are things of beauty. Once understood, the student can say, "Yes, that
makes sense. I like that!" We can call this our "ecstasy." Contrarily,
other parts of Corporate Tax leave us shaking our heads and saying,
"Congress really ought to be able to do better than that." The rules
might not make much sense, or at the very least, be more complex
than is really necessary. We can call this our "agony"; although some-
times, we find the complexity almost perversely humorous. For exam-
ple, referring to the definition of personal holding company income, a
leading casebook offers this black humor:
Students of the Internal Revenue Code have come to expect a large degree of
complexity when Congress seeks to prevent tax avoidance. Congress must an-
2. I first taught the basic Corporate Tax course in the spring semester of 1979 and
have taught it every year since. I added a second course, then called Advanced
Corporate Tax in the fall of 1986. In the middle of that semester, Congress
adopted the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085,
and dramatically changed the corporate tax rules. A number of years later, I
cleverly changed the name of Advanced Corporate Tax to Corporate Tax II, as-
tutely thinking that students might be less apprehensive about taking a course
not called "Advanced Corporate Tax." Of course, the only students eligible to
take Corporate Tax II are those who have taken Corporate Tax I.
3. CHERYL D. BLOCK, CORPORATE TAXATION: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS xxiv (2d
ed. 2001).
4. I.R.C. § 351 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004). All sections referenced in this article
refer to the Internal Revenue Code unless otherwise indicated.
5. I.R.C. § 331 (2000).
6. Id. § 368.
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ticipate new efforts to avoid its corrective legislation and simultaneously avoid
penalizing taxpayers engaged in legitimate business or investment activities.
These dual and often competing goals contribute to a web of special rules and
exceptions. And so it is that the definition of personal holding company in-
come in [§1 543(a) is one of the Code's most diabolical provisions that may
easily exceed your gloomiest expectations. 7
In this Article, I explain some of the causes for the bad rules in
corporate tax. Then I provide an example of some ecstacy-logical
and well-drafted rules. Next, I point out the sources of our agony-the
diabolical and stupid rules that I have encountered in teaching this
course. Finally, I recommend changes for improving corporate tax
law.
II. SOME REASONS FOR THE SILLINESS OF RULES
A. Lack of Time
One of the reasons for some of the silliness and inconsistency in
corporate tax law is the lack of time on the part Congress and its pro-
fessional staff. Congress, of course, has many nontax matters to deal
with. Moreover, political exigencies tend to eat up most of the legisla-
ture's allotted time for tax work. Who has time for looking seriously
at the consideration requirements for tax free reorganizations when
there is a "death tax" to repeal, a "marriage penalty," and earned in-
come tax credits for the working poor? Lowering or raising the rates is
always popular. Capital gains and losses are always topical, though
they sometimes degenerate into the arcane. Section 1257,8 for exam-
ple, deals with the disposition of converted wetlands or highly erodible
crop lands. There also is the need to deal with a gain from the disposi-
tion of § 126 property,9 dealing with the excludable portion of pay-
ments received under, amongst other things, the rural clean water
program,10 and the rural abandoned mine program authorized by the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.11 How can Con-
gress deal with minor rules like tax rules for mergers when the rural
abandoned mine program is at stake?
Due to lack of time, Congress's formulation of corporate tax law
has been mostly incremental and piecemeal.12 It just adds a little bit
at a time, sometimes without even dovetailing the new rules with ex-
7. STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 406 (2d ed. 1987).
8. I.R.C. § 1257 (2000).
9. Id. § 1255.
10. Id. § 126(a)(1).
11. Id. § 126(a)(2).
12. See, e.g., John R. McGowan, Subchapter C Reform of Mergers and Acquisitions
after General Utilities: Now What is Congress Waiting For?, 24 AKRON L. REV.
129, 130 (1990) (discussing the problems of merger and acquisition rules develop-
ing "in a piecemeal fashion"). For a discussion of incremental versus fundamen-
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isting statutory provisions. For example, the tax law has a substan-
tial number of rules regarding the division of either a single
corporation or a group of corporations, including a parent and at least
one subsidiary, into two or more free-standing corporations. They go
by the fun nicknames of a "spin-oft" (parent making a dividend-style
distribution of a subsidiary's stock); a "split-off" (a parent conveying a
subsidiary's stock in redemption of the parent's own stock); and a
"split-up" (a parent distributing subsidiaries' stock to the parent's
shareholders in a liquidation of the parent). Such transactions are
called "corporate divisions" and can be tax free, if various require-
ments are satisfied.13 Some of these requirements come from caselaw.
Others are in the Treasury regulations. But most of them are con-
tained in § 355.14
The Code makes a minor and insignificant distinction between a
"D" reorganization corporate division and a non"D" reorganization cor-
porate division. If a parent needs to put some of its assets into a sub-
sidiary before distributing the subsidiary's stock to the parent's
shareholders, the transaction must satisfy the requirements of
§ 368(a)(1)(D) 15 to be tax free. In other words, it has to be a "D" reor-
ganization. The "D" reorganization status is needed only when the
parent has to put assets in the subsidiary. For instance, suppose Arfie
and Barfie, each fifty percent shareholders, want to divide their single
corporation into two corporations. Each want to take half the busi-
ness so they can go their separate ways. The corporation can "drop
down" half of its assets into a newly created subsidiary and then pro-
ceed with the corporate division, i.e., a split-off. Arfie takes the whole
subsidiary, while Barfie retains all of the parent's stock. To be tax
free, the split-off must be a "D" reorganization as defined in
§ 368(a)(1)(D). Mainly, it must satisfy the rules in § 355. If it does so,
it is a "D" reorganization corporate division.
Many times there is no need to do this "drop down," such as when
the subsidiary already exists and the parent and subsidiary are ripe
for the corporate division. By meeting the requirements of § 355, the
parties can proceed immediately to the division and have it be tax
free. Without the "drop down," this is not a "D" reorganization. But
tal tax reform see generally, Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental
Tax Reform and the Top One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99 (2003).
13. See Comm'r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 90-95 (1968); Comm'r v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485,
491-93 (9th Cir. 1967). For a recent discussion of corporate tax division require-
ments, see Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the SpinoffRules, 56
SMU L. REV. 239 (2003). Mr. Schler calls the spinoff rules "illogical, complex and
uncertain." Id. at 240. Moreover, "the complexities and uncertainties are so
great" that they use more than half of the Internal Revenue Service's time for
corporate divisions. Id.
14. I.R.C. § 355 (2000).
15. See id. § 368.
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we can say "so what?" The tax consequences are the same, because
the important tax criteria are in § 355 and are the same for both
transactions. Additionally, the economic effect of the transactions are
virtually the same.
There is a silly, picayune difference; however. Section 361(c)16 al-
lows a corporation that is a party to a reorganization to distribute its
own "obligations" to its shareholders without recognizing a gain or
loss.1 7 "Obligations" is a synonym for "debts" and includes short-term
as well as long-term debts. The "obligation" is called "qualified prop-
erty," which allows it to be passed tax free for the distributing corpora-
tion.' 8 This rule applies to "D" reorganizations. Section 355(c)19
provides a nearly identical rule for distributions in a tax free corpora-
tion division that is not a "D" reorganization. However, the subsidi-
ary's debt must be a "security" for it to be distributed tax free. 20 The
term "securities" refers solely to "long-term" debt, whereas the term
"obligations" covers any type of debt, short-term or long-term. Con-
gress amended § 361(c) at the same time it added § 355(c) to the
Code. 2 1 It easily could have dovetailed the rules in §§ 355(c) and
361(c) regarding the distribution of debt. There is no important differ-
ence between the transactions described in the two sections. They
cover basically identical transactions but contain this minute differ-
ence. With just a little more time and attention, these rules would be
identical like they should be.
The history of forward and reverse triangular mergers, transac-
tions described infra, further illustrates the incremental nature of cor-
porate tax legislation. In the infamous Groman22 and Bashford23
cases, the Internal Revenue Service successfully argued that triangu-
lar acquisition techniques failed to qualify as tax free reorganizations.
In Groman,24 the Supreme Court held that a forward triangular
merger failed the continuity of interest requirement, because the
shareholders of the target corporation received stock of the acquiring
corporation's parent instead of the acquiring corporation itself. In
16. Id. § 361(c).
17. Id. § 361(c)(1), (c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B)(i); see 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES C. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS I 11.11(1)(d) &
ex.2 (7th ed. 2000).
18. I.R.C. § 361(c)(1), (c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B)(i).
19. Id. § 355(c).
20. Id. § 355(c)(2)(B); 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 11.11(1)(c) n.277.
21. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 1018(d)(5), 102 Stat. 3342, 3578-81.
22. Groman v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 82 (1937).
23. Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
24. 302 U.S. at 88-89; see David S. Miller, The Devolution and Inevitable Extinction
of the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 187, 203-04 (1996).
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Bashford,2 5 the Supreme Court again found a lack of continuity of in-
terest, because the property acquired by the acquiring corporation was
"dropped down" to its subsidiary as part of the reorganization plan.
The reasoning of the Internal Revenue Service and Supreme Court in
these two cases was spurious. They said that the shareholders did not
continue their interest in the target corporation, a requirement for a
tax free reorganization. However, the shareholders of the target cor-
poration clearly continued their interest in the target by taking stock
in a parent corporation that owned all the stock of a subsidiary that
owned all of the target's assets.
Eventually, the private sector convinced both the Internal Revenue
Service and Congress that triangular techniques and "drop downs"
were the economic equivalent of the tax free acquisition techniques
authorized by § 368 and should also be tax free. 2 6 In 1954, Congress
authorized drop downs following an otherwise qualifying "A" and "C"
reorganization, and eventually added a similar rule for "B" reorgani-
zations. 2 7 In 1967, the government held that a forward triangular
merger did not qualify as a tax free reorganization, as the parent was
not a party to the reorganization. However, it could qualify as a "C"
reorganization if the conditions of that section were satisfied. 28 Con-
gress finally provided statutory approval of forward triangular merg-
ers in 1968, adding § 368(a)(2)(D) to the Code.29 Though a forward
triangular merger is basically a species of an "A" reorganization,
§ 368(a)(2)(D) creates a hybrid category of reorganization. It requires
a mish-mash set of conditions taken from both the "A" and "C" reor-
ganization rules.
The reverse triangular merger has a somewhat similar history. In
Revenue Ruling 67-448,30 the Internal Revenue Service approved the
structure as an authorized form of a tax free reorganization, but it had
to meet the requirements of a stock-for-stock reorganization, known as
a "B" reorganization. This creates a strict rule about the type of con-
25. 302 U.S. at 458; see generally Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations:
Purging Penelope's Web, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1369-73 (1985) (discussing the
continuity of interest doctrine in Groman and Bashford); Christine M. Adams,
Comment, Corporate Reorganizations Get A New Look: Tightening the Reigns on
the Runaway Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 261, 273
(1998) (discussing the continuity of interest doctrine in Groman and Bashford).
26. STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 470 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter LIND 1997].
27. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(C) (2000); see LIND 1997, supra note 26, at 470. "A" reorganiza-
tions refer to mergers as defined under state statutes. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
"C" reorganizations refer to transactions involving the target selling substan-
tially all of its assets. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
28. Rev. Rul. 67-326, 1967-2 C.B. 143.
29. Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-621, 82 Stat. 1310.
30. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144.
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sideration the acquiring corporation can use.3 1 Congress responded in
1971 by enacting current § 368(a)(2)(E), 3 2 which approves reverse tri-
angular mergers as tax free reorganizations. 3 3 However, it requires
still another mish-mash of requirements, some resembling "A" reorga-
nizations and some resembling "B" reorganizations. 34
The end result: the Internal Revenue Code now has § 368(a)(2)(D)
and § 368(a)(2)(E) approving forward triangular and reverse triangu-
lar mergers as tax free reorganizations respectively, each with its own
set of requirements that are different from the requirements for all of
the other of tax free acquisition techniques. Congress added the for-
ward triangular merger rules to the Code in 1968.35 It added the re-
verse triangular merger rules in 1971.36 Ironically, the economic
result of each of these two acquisition techniques is identical-the ac-
quiring corporation has acquired the target and now holds it as a sub-
sidiary. Why different Code requirements for basically identical
transactions? Congress, it seems, did not take enough time to note
that the substance of the transactions were identical. They should be
covered by the same set of rules. As a distinguished writer recently
said, "An otherwise rational proposal to reform the taxation of certain
transactions . . . may be less sensible once consideration is given to
broader patterns and inconsistencies in the tax law. Nowhere is this
more true than in the corporate tax area and subchapter C of the
Code." 3 7
Reorganizations are always ripe for a profound review, but Con-
gress has not made more than piecemeal changes in the last fifty
years. Congress has had some excellent opportunities to evaluate fun-
damental reorganization issues. The organized tax bar, accounting
groups, and the American Law Institute have provided Congress with
ample studies of fundamental subchapter C issues in the early
1980s. 38 The Senate Finance Committee took several years to write a
31. In a "B" reorganization, the acquiring corporation can use only its own voting
stock to make the acquisition. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
32. Id. § 368(a)(2)(E).
33. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2077.
34. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E); 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 12.22(3).
35. Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-621, 82 Stat. 1310.
36. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2077.
37. George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Divisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 289, 289 (2003).
38. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS 9 (1982) [hereinafter ALI, SUB-
CHAPTER C]; FED. TAX Drw., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, TAXATION
OF THE FORMATION AND COMBINATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1979); Comm. on
Corporate Stockholder Relationships, Am. Bar Ass'n, Recommendation No. 1981-
5: To Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Simplify, Redifine, and Make
More Uniform the Various Forms of Acquisitive Corporate Reorganizations, 34
TAX LAw. 1386 (1981); Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, New York Bar Com-
ments on Scope of Subchapter C Study, 19 TAX NOTES 129 (1983); Tax Section,
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report entitled "The Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985."39 Congress
did include several important recommendations in the new Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.40 However, for whatever reason, Congress did
not seriously evaluate the diamond in the crown of the American Law
Institute and Senate Finance Committee reports-a complete, new
system for tax free reorganizations. 4 1
B. Politics
Politics can make for untidy tax rules as recent events involving
the taxation of dividends vividly illustrate. The disparate treatment
of interest on corporate debt and dividends has never made much
sense. They are similar economically-routine periodic payments to
corporate investors. Moreover, the more favorable tax treatment for
interest often has been viewed as creating an improper incentive to
American corporations to over-leverage.42
Still, changing the dividend rules has proven difficult, because
among other reasons, a decrease of the tax on dividends would result
in the loss of substantial tax revenue for the United States. In addi-
tion, many of the benefits would accrue to wealthy taxpayers. In early
2003, President Bush presented a relatively complicated proposal to
eliminate the tax on dividends paid to human shareholders. Its propo-
nents claimed to be motivated primarily by a desire to stimulate the
economy.4 3 They also claimed that the proposal constituted a salutary
reform of corporate tax law, removing the incentive for corporations to
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, New York Bar Comments on Proposed Subchapter C
Changes, 20 TAX NOTES 679 (1983); Taxation Section Tax Force, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Income Taxation of Corporations Making Distributions with Respect to Their
Stock, 37 TAX LAw. 625 (1984).
39. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION
ACT OF 1985 (Comm. Print 1985).
40. For example, Congress continued the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine and
enacted the current § 382 pertaining to net operating loss carry forwards. See
H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 282 (1985); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841, at 11-202
(1986); Special Rules Relating to Dispositions and Deconsolidations of Subsidiary
Stock, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426 (Mar. 14, 1990) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); LIND
1997, supra note 26, at 504.
41. See LIND 1997, supra note 26, at 504.
42. See, e.g., 2003 TAX LEGISLATION: JOBS AND KNOWN TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION
ACT OF 2003: LAw, EXPLANATION, AND ANALYSIS 325, at 87 (CCH 2003) [herein-
after 2003 TAX LEGISLATION]; Peter C. Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition,
39 TAX LAw. 91 (1985); Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and
Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1494-95 (1987).
43. See generally Bob Davis & Peter McKay, Dividend Tax Cut Pleases Companies
More Than Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2003, at C1 (discussing the Bush Ad-
ministration's tax cut on dividends).
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issue debt instead of stock.44 The proposal, though it had the good
"pedigree, having evolved out of carefully crafted Treasury Depart-
ment recommendations taking into account all possible ill effects of
integration,"45 had the two difficulties noted above. There was too
much opposition in Congress to pass it as it was. Instead, a compro-
mise ensued. The final result was a partial exclusion of dividends
paid to humans. It is not a carefully constructed set of rules. Whether
good or bad for the economy, the new rules are not good tax reform.
Their creation was scarcely crisp and pristine tax law formulation.
C. Responding to Loopholes
One forever-recurring problem is the opening and closing of loop-
holes. The private sector constantly searches for weaknesses in the
current tax system, looking for loopholes that save taxes. This con-
stant probing often results in byzantine concoctions that are hard to
understand even for the cognoscenti. Though the most important cor-
porate tax law sections provide ordinary rules to govern common
transactions, like § 301 on dividends,46 § 351 on incorporations, 4 7 and
§ 331 and related sections on liquidations, 48 loophole-closing sections
abound. They often provide the most complex and, therefore, the silli-
est sets of rules.
Corporate tax law generally has "developed largely in a piecemeal
fashion, as provisions have been added or modified to address specifi-
cally targeted problems or abuses[,] ... [producing] rules ... criticized
as inconsistent and unnecessarily complex that produce uncertain and
... capricious results."49 Taxpayers resort to what is at the time a
legal means to avoid taxation. The government responds with com-
plex rules to limit avoidance. Taxpayers respond by inventing new
complex transactions to circumvent the new rules. Both sides create a
vicious cycle that leads to new, more complex rules and increasingly
sophisticated and complex transactions.50
The history of the collapsible corporation provides an illustration of
this continuing process. The origins of the collapsible corporation
were rather glamorous, involving Hollywood and famous movie
44. Heather Bennett & Patti Mohr, ABA Tax Section Midyear Meeting: Olson Dis-
misses 'Complexity' of Bush's Dividend Tax Cut, 98 TAX NOTES 662, 662-63 (2003);
see 2003 TAx LEGISLATION, supra note 42, 1 325, at 88.
45. 2003 TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 42, 325, at 88.
46. I.R.C. § 301 (2000).
47. Id. § 351.
48. Id. §§ 331-337.
49. McGowan, supra note 12, at 130.
50. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA.
TAX REv. 645, 671 (2003).
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stars. 51 One well-known case involved actor Pat O'Brien and the 1942
movie, Secret Command.52 The stars of the movie, the producer, and
the director would form a corporation to produce a single movie. The
incorporators would receive stock rather than salaries or royalties.
Immediately after completion of the production of the movie, before it
was shown in the theaters, the corporation would liquidate. The cor-
poration would distribute the movie rights to the shareholders. Using
the Code's liquidation sections, the shareholders would recognize a
capital gain (or loss) and take a fair market value basis in the movie
rights.53 At that time, liquidating distributions were tax free to the
liquidating corporation. 54 The tax consequences were absolutely
beautiful for the taxpayers. There would be no double taxation and no
ordinary income-just capital gain-for the shareholders, unless the
revenues exceeded the fair market value of the movie rights. There
would be no tax for the corporation because it never had any income.
It never showed the movie, and thus had no revenue. If the net reve-
nue from showing the movie in the movie theaters never exceeded the
shareholders' basis in the movie rights, the shareholders would have
no further income or gain, because the fair market value of the film
rights was amortized against the proceeds. 5 5
The Internal Revenue Service unsuccessfully attacked collapsible
corporations as tax-evasion devices under common law principles.5 6
After losing in the courts, the Treasury went to Congress for anti-col-
lapsible corporation relief. Congress responded in 195057 with the ca-
tastrophe contained in § 341.58 All of § 341 was poorly drafted, and
parts of it, notably the amnesty provision in § 341(e), epitomize the
51. Much of this brief history is taken from 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, T
10.60.
52. O'Brien v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 376 (1955). I would love to find a video or DVD of this
title but have not found one so far.
53. Sometimes the shareholders would sell their shares to the studio, which would
then liquidate the corporation. This would also produce a capital gain for the
shareholders. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 17 (Comm. Print
1983).
54. The current § 336(a) taxes corporations on their liquidating distributions. I.R.C.
§ 336(a) (2000). This rule came into law in 1986. It replaced the General Utilities
doctrine, which said that liquidating distributions to shareholders were nontax-
able to the corporation. The doctrine is named after General Utilities & Operat-
ing Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1995).
55. See 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 10.60. Receipts in excess of the film's
basis were taxable as income. O'Brien, 25 T.C. at 385-86.
56. See Comm'r v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 1956); Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F.
Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952); O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376.
57. 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 10.60.
58. I.R.C. § 341 (repealed 2003). See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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prolix complexity of corporate tax at its highest pinnacle. 5 9 The Amer-
ican Law Institute in 1982 described § 341 as "characterized by a
pathological degree of complexity, vagueness and uncertainty."
60
The strategic desirability of using a collapsible corporation de-
pended on both a preferential tax rate on capital gains and the corpo-
ration's ability to liquidate or sell property without recognizing a gain
at the corporate level. 6 1 When Congress repealed the General Utili-
ties doctrine6 2 and made corporate distributions to shareholders of ap-
preciated property taxable to the corporation, it made § 341 "almost a
dead letter"63 and "little more than a bloated, but insignificant, relic
from a bygone era."6 4 Nevertheless, it remained in the Code as a trap
for the unwary, 6 5 until 2003, when Congress finally killed it.66
D. Complex Transactions
Corporate tax is a complex subject matter. As one professor says:
Corporate taxation has a reputation, among law students at least, as one of
the most difficult courses in the law school curriculum. This perception mag-
nifies as Congress continues its seemingly endless amendment process, regu-
larly revising . . . Subchapter C . . . . Some of these provisions appear
eminently sensible and others do not. Few of them can be said to simplify
... 67
59. Section 341(e) has been the subject of much gallows humor, including from the
author of this article:
Section 34 1(e) epitomizes the incomprehensibility of Subchapter C of the
Internal Revenue Code. Bittker & Eustice refer to § 341(e) as "labyrin-
thine." B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS T 12.08 (4th ed. 1979). The first sentence of
§ 341(e)(1) has been nominated as the world's longest sentence. See J.
SOBELOFF, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & STOCKHOLD-
ERS 189 (1981). This statement may be hyperbole, but the first sentence
is 537 words long. Furthermore, subsection (e) has 12 sub-subsections,
19 sub-sub-subsections, and 18 sub-sub-sub-subsections. It has been
amended 8 times since 1954 and refers to 9 other sections of the Code.
William J. Rands, Closely Held Corporations: Federal Tax Consequences of Stock
Transfer Restrictions, 7 J. CORP. L. 448, 449 n.1 (1982). A leading casebook has
noted that § 341 "is a statute of epic proportions, containing one infamous sen-
tence [§ 341(e)] that is nearly twice as long as the Gettysburg Address." LIND
1997, supra note 26, at 700.
60. ALI, SUBCHAPTER C, supra note 38, at 111.
61. LIND 1997, supra note 26, at 701.
62. See supra note 54.
63. Bernard Wolfman, Subchapter C and the 100th Congress, 33 TAX NOTES 669, 670
(1986).
64. 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 1 10.60.
65. 1 Id.
66. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§ 302(e)(4)(A), 117 Stat. 752, 763.
67. BLOCK, supra note 3, at xxii.
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Indeed, complexity has been identified as the tax system's biggest
problem, especially for small businesses.68 A notion that taxes should
be simpler evokes almost unanimous agreement. Paradoxically, the
tax law becomes more complex almost every year.69 Much of the tax
law's complexity is attributable to the complexity of corporate struc-
tures and transactions. 70 Though simplification of the tax law is de-
sirable, tax law cannot avoid a degree of complexity. After all,
"American society and its economy are complex."71
One example of unavoidable complexity is the use of affiliated cor-
porations. Though affiliated corporations provide some tax advan-
tages, 72 they provide multiple nontax benefits and are going to be
68. See, e.g., Tax Simplification Proposals: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 95th Cong. 1-2 (1977); 147 CONG. REC. H1937, (daily ed. May 8,
2001) (statement of Rep. Gibbons); 147 CONG. REC. 84418 (daily ed. May 7, 2001);
Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker on Behalf of the Section of Taxation, American Bar
Association, Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the U.S. House of Represent-
atives on the Subject of Revenue Provisions in the President's FY2000 Budget,
March 10, 1999, 52 TAx LAW. 577 (1999); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Panel Says Small
Businesses Suffer Most from Complexity, 88 TAx NOTES 1293 (2000); Report of the
National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service: A Vision for
a New IRS, 75 TAx NOTES 1683, 1701-04 (1997); Review & Outlook: Tax and
Repent, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1997, at A22. A recent article suggests, however,
that "tax complexity is not as bad as political rhetoric leads us to believe." Don-
aldson, supra note 50, at 650.
69. William G. Gayle, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, 92 TAX NOTES 1463,
1463 (2001).
70. One author suggests these four reasons for the complexity of our tax code:
(1) Conflict among the consensus goals of tax policy: Competing policy
objectives requires efforts to balance one or more goals against each
other.
(2) The political process: Politicians and interests groups want targeted
subsidies that reduce taxes for particular groups or activities.
Targeted subsidies inevitably make complexity by creating distinc-
tions among taxpayers and sources and uses of income.
(3) Deterring tax avoidance: The federal government often responds to
tax avoidance efforts with complex rules designed to limit avoidance.
Taxpayers respond by inventing complex transactions to circumvent
the new rules. This creates a vicious cycle leading to more and more
complex rules and increasingly complex avoidance techniques.
(4) Increasing revenue: The government passed complicated provisions
to raise revenue or limit revenue losses during times of rampant
budget deficits.
Id. at 1466.
71. Donaldson, supra note 50, at 660.
72. According to a leading casebook, these include: (1) Filing a consolidated return;
(2) Using different accounting methods for taxable years; (3) Reallocation of in-
come to avoid progressive tax rates; (4) Use of multiple tax benefits, e.g., the
accumulated earnings tax credit; (5) Favorable disposition of unwanted assets,
e.g., tax free spin-offs; and (6) Flexibility regarding earnings, profits, and share-
holder distributions. RICHARD L. DOERNBERG & HOWARD E. ABRAMS, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 525 (3d ed. 2000).
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used. 73 A system of affiliated corporations can become extremely com-
plex. No law limits the number and tiers of subsidiaries that a corpo-
ration may have. A parent corporation may have ten tiers of
subsidiaries and thousands of subsidiaries in those tiers. It seems im-
possible to avoid complex tax laws to deal with them.74
Likewise, nontax reasons provide some of the motivation for using
the complex transactions involved with forward triangular mergers 7 5
and reverse triangular mergers. 76 The reverse triangular merger is
especially byzantine. In this transaction, an acquiring corporation ei-
ther creates, or has in place, its own subsidiary to assist in the acquisi-
73. The Doernberg and Abrams business tax casebook lists them as follows:
(1) Minimizing potential tort liability... ;
(2) Regulatory restraints or benefits of combining businesses within a
single corporation;
(3) Avoiding state law complications;
(4) Existence of favorable, nonavailable contractual arrangements;
(5) Alleviation of labor problems; and
(6) Existence of corporate good will.
Id. As a general proposition, each corporation and affiliated group of corpora-
tions is entitled to limited liability. This protects the assets of each from the
creditors of any other members, unless there are grounds for piercing their corpo-
rate veils. If the different members of the group were consolidated into one corpo-
ration, the assets of all of the members would be available to any creditor.
74. The primary code sections on affiliated corporations are I.R.C. §§ 1501-1504,
1551-1552, 1561, 1563 (2000). These code sections are not necessarily easy to
understand, but they pale in comparison to the regulations, which take up hun-
dreds of pages. For example, the regulations for § 1502 start with Treasury Reg-
ulation section 1.1502-0 and reach section 1.1502-100. They take up 554 pages in
Commerce Clearing House's looseleaf service. See 14 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
33,141-33,206 (2003).
75. If a target merges into an acquiring corporation, the acquiring corporation inher-
its the liabilities of the target corporation by operation of state statute. This as-
sumption of the liabilities is not particularly a problem for the liabilities on the
target's books at the time of the merger. The acquiring corporation can factor
those liabilities into the price paid. The real danger is inchoate liabilities, like
future product liabilities claims. The acquiring corporation inherits these, too,
even though they are not yet known. They cannot be factored into the purchase
price.
In the forward triangular merger, the target merges into a subsidiary of the
acquiring corporation. The subsidiary technically acquires the target, though the
parent is the true party in interest. The parent's assets are protected from the
target's inchoate liabilities, because those liabilities flow into the subsidiary,
which probably was newly created and has no assets other than the target's as-
sets acquired in the merger. Under the doctrine of limited liability, the subsidi-
ary alone is responsible for the target's liability, except in the unusual
circumstances that would permit a creditor to pierce the subsidiary's corporate
veil.
76. Like the forward triangular merger, the reverse triangular merger prevents in-
choate liabilities from flowing into an acquiring corporation. In the reverse trian-
gular merger, the subsidiary of the true acquirer (the parent) merges into the
target and the parent takes a controlling block of the target's stock. Thus, the
target is kept alive. Therefore, it is responsible for its own liabilities.
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tion of a target corporation. The subsidiary merges into the target and
the target shareholders must receive at least some of the acquiring
corporation's stock. The transaction is "triangular," because it in-
volves three corporations: the subsidiary, the target, and the acquir-
ing/parent corporation. Since this is an acquisition of the target, the
target shareholders must surrender at least the majority of their
shares to the acquiring corporation, even though the target corpora-
tion, not the subsidiary, survives the merger. Indeed, generally, the
reason for using the reverse triangular merger usually is to keep the
target corporation alive as a corporate entity. The target might own
valuable but inalienable franchise or contract rights that would other-
wise be lost.
There are several permutations for assuring that the right parties
get the right shares of stock. The acquiring corporation can issue
some of its own stock to the subsidiary and have the plan of merger
require that the subsidiary distribute the stock to the target's share-
holders upon the merger. Alternatively, the acquiring corporation can
skip that rather ephemeral step of placing its stock in the subsidiary,
and convey the stock itself, probably directly to the target's sharehold-
ers. The acquiring corporation could also perhaps convey the stock to
the target, which then can distribute those shares to its own share-
holders. The parties also need to craft a way to get target stock out of
the hands of the target shareholders and to the acquiring/parent cor-
poration. If the target is a closely-held corporation, this objective is
easily accomplished. As all of the target shareholders likely are aware
of the transaction and approve of it, they can convey their shares di-
rectly to the acquiring/parent corporation. The matter is more compli-
cated when the target corporation is publicly held. Instead of
expecting the target shareholders to transfer their stock to the acquir-
ing/parent corporation, the target corporation might have the articles
of merger amend the articles of incorporation to create a new class of
stock with voting control of the target. The new stock is issued to the
acquiring/parent corporation. The previously outstanding target stock
might be reduced to a mere claim to be paid the target's consideration
for the merger, such as the acquiring corporation's stock.
Triangular acquisitions raise technical problems regarding the ap-
plication of the usual corporate tax rules. For example, § 1032(a)7 7
provides nonrecognition treatment when a corporation issues its own
stock to acquire assets. Section 1032(a) makes good policy sense. In
our capitalistic society, we want to enable our corporations to acquire
capital by issuing stock without the impediment of tax. Moreover, the
issuance of stock is not the same as operating a business. It does not
produce business profits. This section applies with ease when the ac-
77. I.R.C. § 1032(a) (West 2002).
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quiring corporation issues stock to a target or target shareholders in
straightforward transactions, like a merger of a target into the acquir-
ing corporation or a sale of target's assets directly to the acquiring
corporation.
In the triangular acquisition techniques, however, § 1032(a) often
does not literally apply. The parent is the true party in interest, but it
is using a subsidiary to do the acquiring for it. Technically, a subsidi-
ary is the acquiring corporation and the stock of the parent/acquiring
corporation is the consideration paid to the target or the target's
shareholder. The problem is that the "acquiring corporation," the sub-
sidiary, does not issue its own stock. The Treasury Department issued
regulations to take care of this technical glitch. The regulations make
the transaction nontaxable to the parent and subsidiary under§ 1032(a). 78  This is the proper policy result. Everyone wants
§ 1032(a) to apply here. However, this certainly is not a perfect for-
mulation of tax law-a regulation applying a rule from a code section
to a transaction not covered by that code section. Section 1032(a) just
has not caught up yet with the transaction's complexities.79
III. CODE SECTIONS LIKE DIAMONDS
Though many corporate tax rules are byzantine, and maybe not
even sensible, a few of them are gems-true diamonds. Section 351
and its related sections constitute one such gemstone.
In a nutshell, § 351 and related sections cover transfers of assets to
a controlled corporation in exchange for the stock of that corporation.
Neither the corporation nor the shareholder recognize a gain or a loss.
Section 1032(a) provides nonrecognition for a corporation when it is-
sues its own stock to acquire assets. Section 1032(a) applies whether
or not the shareholder is entitled to nonrecognition under § 351. The
corporation takes a carryover basis in its new assets (the same basis
that the shareholder had in those transferred assets).80 Additionally,
§ 351(a)S1 provides nonrecognition for the shareholders. It turns what
otherwise would be an exchange of property creating a gain or loss for
the shareholder into a nontaxable event. Generally, the exchange
happens when the shareholder places assets in a corporation at the
time of incorporation, but § 351(a) applies any time that its require-
ments are met. Section 35882 provides what can be a relatively
lengthy formula for determining a shareholder's basis in the new
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-2 (as amended in 2000).
79. Another technical problem addressed in the regulations is the parent corpora-
tion's basis in the subsidiary's stock after a triangular reorganization. For its
resolution, see Treas. Reg. § 1.358-6 (1995).
80. I.R.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000).
81. Id. § 351(a).
82. Id. § 358.
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stock received. Often, however, the shareholder merely takes the
same basis that the shareholder had in the property transferred to the
corporation.8 3 Section 357(a)8 4 assures that when the corporation
takes property subject to liabilities or assumes liabilities, it does not
destroy § 351 exchange status.
Since the shareholder usually takes the same basis in her new
stock that she had in the property transferred, any potential gain or
loss in the property stays with the shareholder through her basis in
the stock. She will recognize it if she sells her stock, which, at least
initially, probably is worth approximately the net value of the prop-
erty transferred.
Section 351(a) contains three basic requirements: (1) A taxpayer
transfers property to a corporation; (2) In exchange for this property,
the transferor receives stock of the transferee corporation; and (3) Im-
mediately after this exchange, the transferor controls the transferee
corporation. The control required-80%-is defined in § 368(c).8 5
The tax consequences can become more complicated if the corpora-
tion conveys something other than its stock to the transferors. This is
known as "boot." Also, liabilities can make things a little bit more
complicated, although they usually do not. Even if boot is used or lia-
bilities are present, the degree of complication is not overwhelming,
and the rules make sense.
The nonrecognition and substituted/carryover basis rules are sup-
ported both by theory and policy. The theory is that a transfer of prop-
erty to a controlled corporation in exchange for some of its stock is no
more than a change in form.8 6 A much cited, older case states that the
purpose of these rules is
to save the taxpayer from an immediate recognition of a gain, or to intermit
the claim of a loss, in certain transactions where gain or loss may have ac-
crued in a constitutional sense, but where in a popular and economic sense
there has been a mere change in form of ownership and the taxpayer has not
really "cashed in" on the theoretical gain, or closed out a losing venture.
8 7
The theory is easiest to comprehend in the case of a sole proprietor
who incorporates her business. There is no substantive difference be-
tween an individual owning the property and that person's solely
owned corporation owning the same property. It is like someone tak-
ing money out of her wallet and putting it into her bank account. The
change from a proprietorship to a corporation is a mere difference in
form, not a bona fide disposition that should trigger a gain, a loss, or
83. Id. § 358(a). The vernacular for this kind of basis is "substituted basis."
84. Id. § 357(a).
85. Id. § 368(c).
86. See Paulsen v. Comm'r, 469 U.S. 131, 136 (1985).
87. Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940).
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even a change in basis. When she owns 100% of the corporation, the
individual has not cashed in on a gain or closed out on a loss.
The theory behind § 351 sometimes falls down when a group of
transferors, who heretofore have not been operating these assets,
transfer them into a single business. For example, suppose four unre-
lated persons who have not been in business together decide that each
will provide a newly formed corporation with an asset in exchange for
25% of its stock. The law is well settled that § 351 and its related
sections will provide full nonrecognition for all taxpayers.8 8 Before
the § 351 exchange, each person had complete dominion and a 100%
economic interest in her asset. After the exchanges, each has a 25%
interest in an entity that owns other property. That amounts to more
than a change in form. It seems the transferor has cashed in on her
piece of property, and perhaps, should be taxed on the transaction.
Thus, as the theory of a mere change does not fit, it is perhaps
necessary to offer a policy reason for nonrecognition. Though not often
articulated, an underpinning policy justifies § 351. In a capitalistic
system, as exists in the United States, capital formation is an absolute
necessity. Congress, at the very least, should avoid tax laws that
would impede capital formation through incorporation. Certainly, the
United States does not want its tax laws to interfere with the crucial
transactions that fund its business enterprises.8 9
Like virtually any corporate tax system, § 351 has its nooks and
crannies that can complicate matters. Here, I have no intention of
spelunking in every cave formed by § 351. However, for an example,
some preferred stock, such as "nonqualified preferred stock," cannot
be treated as stock for purposes of § 351(a).
Section 357(c)(1)90 and its directly related co-sections,§ 358(a)(1)(A)(ii)91 and § 358(d)(1)92 illustrate how sensible sec-
tion 351's rules usually are. Generally, in any exchange, a taxpayer
transferring an asset encumbered by a liability must include the lia-
bility in her amount realized, because unloading of that liability is a
tangible economic benefit. Most likely the transferee will pay off that
liability to prevent losing the property. Section 357(a) provides an ex-
ception to this general rule when dealing with § 351 exchanges. Sec-
tion 357(a) provides that the transfer of liabilities by the party
receiving the shares in a § 351 exchange does not count as boot, which
88. See Am. Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1934);
1 BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 3.01.
89. S. REP. No. 67-275 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 181, 188-89 (stating
that nonrecognition provisions allow businesses to go forward with salutary
readjustments).
90. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1) (2000).
91. Id. § 358(a)(1)(A)(ii).
92. Id. § 358(d)(1).
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would create recognition of gain for the transferor under § 351(b).9 3
Moreover, the transfer of the liabilities does not prevent the exchange
from coverage under § 351. When the aggregate basis of the assets
conveyed to the corporation is less than the sum of liabilities trans-
ferred, however, § 357(c)(1) applies, and the transferor must recognize
a gain equal to the sum of the liabilities transferred minus the sum of
the basis of the assets transferred.9 4
Section 357(a) is an exception to the general rule that the transfer
of liabilities to another party is taxable income or gain to the trans-
feror. Section 357(c)(1) is an exception to that exception. An exception
to an exception is not unusual. Actually in this case, there is an excep-
tion to an exception to an exception (§ 357(c)(3)(A)), and an exception
to an exception to an exception to an exception (§ 357(c)(3)(B)).
Section 358(d)(1) says the transferor must treat transferred liabili-
ties as cash paid to him by the corporation when calculating his basis
in his new stock. The stock's basis decreases by the amount of the
liabilities under § 358(a)(1)(A)(ii), which requires a basis decrease
equal to the amount of any money received by the transferor. The
basis adjustment preserves any gain avoided by unloading the liabil-
ity tax free based on § 357(a). The basis reduction accounts for the
fact that any person buying the stock from the transferor will only pay
a price equaling the corporation's equity in its assets. Combining the
nonrecognition rule of § 351(c)(1) and the basis reduction rules for lia-
bilities under § 358, the shareholder ultimately will recognize the
same amount of gain or loss when later selling the stock. Once stu-
dents see how this works, they are pleased with the neatness of this
result.
Here is an example: Arfie, a human, owns this asset:
fair market value $100
basis $20
liability encumbering asset $30
How much in cash would someone pay for this asset, if the asset re-
mains encumbered by the liability? The answer is $70 cash: the fair
market value of the asset, $100, minus the liability, $30, which is the
owner's equity in this asset. Arfie's amount realized equals $70 cash
plus $30 liability transferred, which equals $100. Arfie's gain is the
amount realized, $100, minus his basis, $20, which ends up at $80.
If Arfie transfers this encumbered asset to a corporation for 100%
of the stock, Arfie will not be entitled to complete nonrecognition
under § 351(a) and § 357(a). Instead, he must immediately recognize
93. Id. § 351(c).
94. Id. § 357(c)(1).
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a $10 gain under § 357(c)(1), 95 because the $30 liability exceeds Arfie's
$20 basis by $10. Arfie's basis in his stock? It is covered by the
formula contained in § 358. His new basis equals his $20 basis in the
asset transferred ("substituted basis") minus the $30 liability (treated
as cash boot paid to him on account of § 358(d)(1)) plus his $10 gain
recognized, 96 which equals $0. How much would an outsider pay for
Arfie's stock? Probably $70 in cash-because that is the corporation's
net worth, as measured by the fair market of its assets minus its lia-
bilities. The gain on the sale of the stock would be $70. Putting to-
gether the § 357(c)(1) gain on the § 351 exchange and on the sale of
the stock, the total gain is:
$10 gain on the § 351 exchange
+$70 gain on the sale of the stock
$80 total gain
This $80 gain is the same as if Arfie had sold the property without
incorporating. Neat! Of course, the bifurcation of the gain may result
in splitting the tax in different years. Also, if Arfie had transferred an
ordinary income piece of property to the corporation in the § 351 ex-
change, he likely transposed the $70 of gain from ordinary income into
capital gain. Still, this is a likeable result. Theory says that § 351
exchanges are mere changes in form. Here, Arfie gets the same end
result, whether he incorporates or not. How appealing!97
IV. THE ABYSS OF THE CONTROL TEST
Often, people use the word "plethora" without knowing that it has
a negative connotation. The speaker may use the word to refer to the
existence or presence of much or many of something, maybe even a lot
of good things. However, "plethora" actually means an excess of some-
thing and, sometimes, even an abundance of bad things. Used prop-
erly, with its negative connotation, "plethora" accurately describes the
95. Id. § 351(c)(1).
96. Section 358(a)(1) requires the transferor to increase his basis in the stock by the
amount of gain recognized on the exchange. Id. § 358(a)(1)(B)(ii). In addition to
recognizing gain in § 357(c)(1), a transferor can recognize a gain by receiving
more routine kinds of boot and by transferring liabilities to the corporation with-
out a business purpose for the transfer. See id. §§ 351(b), 357(b).
97. Not everyone finds the results from § 351 exchanges appealing. The Bittker &
Eustice text notes that if the shareholder sells the stock and the corporation sells
the property, each recognizes a gain or a loss because of the transferor's substi-
tuted basis and the corporation's carryover basis. Without these basis rules,
there would be only a single gain or loss, recognized by the individual on the time
of the § 351 exchange. This result, of course, is part of the basic system of double
taxation for C corporations under the Internal Revenue Code. Nevertheless, this
fine and wonderful treatise, which is really criticizing the two-tier taxation re-
gime, calls this set of rules "confining, complicated, and costly." 1 BTTKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 17, 3.02[1].
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"control" tests and rules contained in the corporate tax portions of the
Internal Revenue Code. Multitudinous operative tax rules depend on
whether a particular taxpayer owns a required percentage of the stock
of a corporation.9 8 References to many of the control tests are set out
in the margin. 99 Some of the control tests require a taxpayer to own
more than 50% of the stock of a corporation. For example, § 267 disal-
98. Stuart Lazar, The Definition of Voting Stock and the Computation of Voting
Under Sections 368(c) and 1504(a): Recent Developments and Tax Lore, 17 VA.
TAX REV. 103, 105 (1997).
99. The following list paraphrases some of the control tests.
I.R.C. § 52 (2000):
Special Rules.
(a)-"Controlled group" corporations for the purpose of computing
work opportunity credit defined according to § 1563(a), except
that "more than 50 percent" is substituted with "at least 80 per-
cent" where it appears in § 1563(a)(1), and the determination
shall be made without regard to the requirements § 1563(a)(4)
and (e)(3)(C).
I.R.C. § 267 (2000):
Losses, Expenses and Interest with Respect to Transactions Between
Related Taxpayers.
(f)(1)-"Controlled group" for purpose of limiting deduction for
losses uses the definition for controlled group from § 1563(a),
but uses "more than 50 percent" rather than "at least 80 per-
cent," and the determination shall be made without regard to
the requirements in § 1563(a)(4) and (e)(3)(C).
I.R.C. § 269 (2000):
Acquisitions Made to Evade or Avoid Income Taxes.
(a)-Control for the purpose of limiting deductions associated
with acquiring losses is defined as ownership of stock possess-
ing at least 50% of the total combined voting power of all clas-
ses of stock entitled to vote or at least 50% of the total value of
shares of classes of stock of the corporation.
I.R.C. § 304 (2000):
Redemption Through Use of Related Corporations.
(c)-Control for purposes of treating a stock redemption as a dis-
tribution is defined as 50% of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 50% of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock.
I.R.C. § 351 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004):
Transfer to Corporation Controlled by Transferor.
(a)-Control for controlled corporation as defined in § 368(c).
(c)(2)-Provides special control rule for distribution to sharehold-
ers when the requirements of § 355 or § 356 are satisfied.
I.R.C. § 355 (2000):
Distribution of Stock and Securities of a Controlled Corporation.
(a)(1)(D)(ii)-Applies the "control" definition in § 368(c) as part of
test for the purpose of determining when a corporation can dis-
tribute stock to a shareholder or security to a security holder
without creating taxable income for the shareholder or security
holder.
(d)(7)(A)-Applies related party rules § 267(b) and § 707(b)(1) to
define a person.
I.R.C. § 368 (2000):
Definitions Relating to Corporate Reorganizations.
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lows a deduction for a loss on a sale of property between a shareholder
and that shareholder's more than 50%-owned corporation.100 Other
control tests require a taxpayer to own 80% or more of the stock of a
corporation. Most important of these are § 368(c) and § 1504(a). Un-
fortunately, the various control tests tend-to have trivial idiosyncra-
cies that make them different. Unless a policy reason supports a
particular set of idiosyncracies, this just makes no sense. How many
distinctive sets of 50% or 80% control tests are needed? The answer
would seem to be one each.
A. Different 80% Control Tests
Section 368(c) has an 80% control test control for, among other
things, two of the most important corporate tax sections-§ 351,101
(a)(2)(H)-Sets out whether a transaction qualifies under
§ 368(1)(D). When § 354(b)(1)(A) and (B) are met, "control" has
the meaning given under §304(c).
(c)-Sets out the meaning of control for part I (except for § 304),
part II, part III, and part V as "the ownership of stock possess-
ing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock."
I.R.C. § 512 (2000):
Unrelated Business Taxable Income.
(b)(13)(D)(I)-Provides a definition of control for a corporation and
a partnership.
I.R.C. § 1551 (2000):
Disallowance of the Benefits of the Graduated Corporate Rates and
Accumulated Earnings Credit.
(b)-Defines control for purposes of §1551(a) as follows: Control
under (a)(1) and (2), ownership by the transferor corporation or
its shareholders or both with at least 80% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of voting stock or at least 80% of the
total value of share of all classes of the stock. Control under
(a)(3), ownership by the five or fewer individuals in (a)(3) pos-
sessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all
classes of voting stock or at least 80% of the total value of share
of all classes of the stock of each corporation AND more than
50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of
each corporation, only to the extent such stock ownership is
identical with respect to each ownership of stock. Section
1563(e) "constructive ownership" applies to this subsection in
determining the ownership of stock.
I.R.C. § 1563 (2000):
Definitions and Special Rules.
(a)-"Controlled group" of corporations for the purpose of filing
consolidated returns means any group of a parent-sub con-
trolled group, brother-sister controlled group, and combined
group. Each of these has a different control test.
(c)-Excludes certain stock from the parent-sub controlled group
and the brother-sister group.
100. I.R.C. § 267(a)(1), (b)(2) (2000). For other sections using a 50% stock ownership
control test, see id. §§ 269(a), 304(c), 318(a)(2)(C), 318(a)(3)(C).
101. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
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the centerpiece of corporate organization, and § 368, defining reorgan-
ization.10 2 Section 368(c) defines "control" as "the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all clas-
ses of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation."10 3 For the pur-
pose of testing voting control, voting stock is aggregated and treated
as a single class of stock.10 4 If the corporation issues nonvoting stock,
§ 368(c) requires ownership of at least 80% of each class of nonvoting
stock.105
Section 1504(a)(2) likewise has an 80% control for key corporate
tax sections. For example, it provides part of the definition for an af-
filiated group of corporations,10 6 which in turn defines the require-
ments for when a group of related corporations can file a consolidated
return.' 0 7 Section 1504(a)(2) also provides a rule for determining
when subsidiary corporations can liquidate into a parent corporation
tax free.1 0 8 Section 1504(a)(2) defines "control" as ownership of stock
"possess[ing] at least 80 percent of the total voting power of the stock"
and having "a value equal to at least 80 percent of the total value of
the stock of such corporation."1 0 9
Both § 368(c) and § 1504(a)(2) require ownership of at least 80% of
the corporation's voting power. Although, the two sections use slightly
different language, which is bad drafting. There is no substantial dif-
ference between the two tests in their voting stock requirements They
do differ, however, on their second requirements. Section 368(c) re-
quires ownership of at least 80% of each class of nonvoting stock,
while § 1504(a)(2) requires ownership of at least 80% in value of all
stock. It really makes little sense to have two slightly different 80%
control tests that are applied willy-nilly throughout the tax code.
Another mini-system, contained in § 1561 and § 1563, eliminates
some of the benefits that otherwise would accrue through the use of
multiple corporations.110 The limitation applies to the flummoxingly-
102. I.R.C. § 361(a) (2000).
103. Id. § 369(c); see Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
104. 1 BrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 3.08[1].
105. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
106. I.R.C. § 1504(a) (2000).
107. Id. § 1501.
108. Id. § 332(b)(1).
109. Id. § 1504(a)(2).
110. These sections combat the following tax evasion technique: a business with a mil-
lion dollars taxable income could divide itself into twenty corporations with
$50,000 taxable income each, so that the entire one million dollars taxable in-
come would be taxed at the lowest § 11 tax rate of 15%. Section 1561(a)(1)
thwarts this scam by treating members of a "controlled group" as a single tax-
payer for purposes of the § 11 tax rates. In this example, the one million dollars
of taxable income would be treated as if it was earned by a single corporate tax-
payer. Not even a legitimate business reason for operating through multiple cor-
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defined "controlled group of corporations." As a leading casebook says:
"The terms 'component members' and 'controlled group of corpora-
tions' are defined in Section 1563. Although simple in concept, these
terms are defined in the Code and regulations with an extraordinary
degree of complexity and specificity.""'' Moreover, to those not versed
in the intricacies of corporate tax law, this phrase, "controlled group of
corporation," sounds confusingly similar to "an affiliated group of cor-
porations," the term used in sections 1501 through 1504 and relevant
to numerous tax rules, especially the ability to file a consolidated re-
turn. And, please, do not confuse either of these with a "qualified
group" of corporations, a term used for attributing indirect foreign tax
credits from lower tier foreign subsidiaries to a United States parent
corporation. Despite the similarity in names, all these groups are in-
dependent of one another. They trigger different operative tax rules
and have their own distinctive requirements.
Section 1563(a) defines two types of "controlled group of corpora-
tions"-parent-subsidiary controlled groups 1 12 and "brother-sister
controlled groups." 113 Both types of "controlled groups" have as part
of their control test the ownership of stock possessing at least 80% of
the voting power OR stock possessing at least 80% of value of all
stock.114 The affiliated group definition has an 80% voting AND 80%
value test.115 What nitpicking differences! OR for one test. AND for
the other. That is stupid.
B. The Value Tests
Sections 951 through 964116 contain monumental United States
international tax rules. When applicable, these rules can impose im-
mediate United States taxation to some United States shareholders
on certain types of income of "controlled foreign corporations," known
vernacularly as "CFCs." A foreign corporation is a CFC when "United
States shareholders" 1 7 own stock, possessing more than 50% of the
porations defeats application of § 1561. See Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 731
F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984).
111. LIND 1997, supra note 26, at 644.
112. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1) (2000).
113. Id. § 1563(a)(2).
114. See id. § 1563(a)(1)(A)-(B) (parent-subsidiary controlled group); id.
§ 1563(a)(2)(A) (brother-sister controlled group). The brother-sister controlled
group definition in § 1563(a) contains an ownership requirement of more than
50% of the voting power or more than 50% of the total value of the all stock. Id.
§ 1563(a)(2)(B).
115. Id. § 1504(a)(2).
116. Id. § 964.
117. "United States shareholder" is not as broad as is sounds. It is a defined term.
Mostly, it includes United States taxpayers owning 10% or more of the total com-
bined voting power of the foreign corporation. Id. § 951(b).
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value.11s As described above, the definitions of "affiliated groups" and
"controlled groups" both also have value tests. In addition, other
value tests are noted in the margin.119
Congress added the value tests to prevent taxpayer manipulation.
For example, prior to 1986, voting power alone determined "control"
for CFC purposes. This led some United States parent corporations to
"decontrol" their foreign subsidiaries by placing stock possessing at
least 50% of the voting power in the hands of friendly foreign taxpay-
ers, who the United States parent knew would not vote against it.
The United States parent corporation would concoct a capital struc-
ture for the foreign subsidiary that reserved for itself far greater than
a 50% economic interest in the foreign company. The Internal Reve-
118. Id. § 957(a).
119. See id. § 1504(a)(2)(A) (80% value test for affiliated corporation); id.
§ 1563(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A)-(B) (80% and 50% value tests for controlled groups of
corporations). Other value tests are strewn throughout the code. See, e.g., id.
§ 267(b)(10) (value test for rule disallowing deduction on transactions between
related parties); id. § 384(b)(2) (value test involved in rule regarding use of preac-
quisition losses to offset built-in gains). An affiliated group of corporations exists
when the common parent owns at least 80% of the voting power and 80% of the
total value of the subsidiary. Id. § 1504(a)(2)(A), (B). A parent company may
elect to treat a foreign company as a domestic company if the parent company
owns 100% of the capital stock. Id. § 1504(d). There are three types of controlled
groups under § 1563:
(1) Controlled group if-
(a) stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80% of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of each of the corporations,
except the common parent corporation, is owned (within the
meaning of subsection (d)(1)) by one or more of the other corpora-
tions; and
(b) the common parent corporation owns (within the meaning of sub-
section (d)(1)) stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80%
of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of at least one of
the other corporations, excluding, in computing such voting
power or value, stock owned directly by such other corporations.
Id. § 1563(a)(1).
(2) Brother-Sister group if-
(a) at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or at least 80% of the total value of shares of
all classes of the stock of each corporation; and
(b) more than 50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or more than 50% of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking into ac-
count the stock ownership of each such person only to the extent
such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corpo-
ration. Id. § 1563(a)(2).
(3) Combined group if-
(a) is a common parent corporation included in a group of corpora-
tions described in paragraph (1); and also
(b) is included in a group of corporations described in brother-sister
group relationship. Id. § 1563(a)(3).
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nue Service complained in court-sometimes successfully, sometimes
not-that the decontrolling arrangement was a ruse and that the
United States parent still had more than 50% voting control. It ar-
gued the foreign corporation should be deemed a CFC.120 In 1986,
Congress added the value test to § 957121 to prevent this manipulative
technique. The foreign corporation is a CFC if the United States par-
ent has more than 50% in value or voting power of the foreign entity.
Similarly, in 1984, Congress added the value component to the
§ 1504(a) test to prevent this machination: a prosperous corporation
acquires an insignificant economic stake in a corporation with net op-
erating losses but also acquires more than 50% of the voting stock so it
can file a consolidated return. It uses the losses as deductions against
its own income. 1 2 2 Congress added the value test to prevent the ac-
quirer from just buying voting control to obtain the net operating loss
deductions. The acquirer must buy stock constituting more than 50%
of the loss corporation's value.
Whether justified or not, there is a disagreeable aspect to value
tests. No matter what the exact percentage of stock ownership is,
someone can argue that their ownership percentage does not corre-
spond to the percentage of the corporation's overall value. Marketa-
bility discounts, control premiums, different classes of stock, stock
transfer restrictions, liquidity problems for large blocks of stock-any
of these features might make the value of the stock acquired different
than the formal percentage of stock acquired.1 2 3 Valuation of equities
is just plainly a difficult task, especially for shares not traded on an
exchange. For example, it is easy to argue that 79% stock ownership
has more than 80% of the value based on a control premium. But
maybe that particular block of 79%-owned stock should be discounted,
because, if put on sale all at once, it would flood the market and bloat
the supply of shares available for purchase. Moreover, what if the ar-
ticles of incorporation or a shareholder agreement give veto power to
minority shareholders? In litigation, each side will proffer competing
experts who will give grossly divergent valuations. Often the judge
120. See, e.g., Koehring Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978); CCA, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 64 T.C. 137 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1; Garlock, Inc. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.
423 (1972), affd, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. I.R.C. § 957.
122. See William F. Huber et al., IRS Offers Insight on 80%-of-Voting-Power Test for
Affiliated Groups, 83 J. TAX'N 12 (1995); see also COMM. ON WAYS & MEANs, TAx
REFORM ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1205-06 (1984).
123. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237; Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation of
Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457 (1982); William P. Lyons & Martin J.
Whitman, Valuing Closely Held Corporations and Publicly Traded Securities
with Limited Marketability Approach to Allowable Discounts from Gross Values,
33 Bus. LAW. 2213 (1978).
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will disagree with both of them.124 Value tests are a morass. I hate
them.
V. THE AUGEAN STABLES OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE
OWNERSHIP TESTS
Part and parcel of the control requirements are the constructive
ownership rules. They are numerous, and references to many of them
are set out in the margin. 1 2 5 Generally speaking, these various sets of
124. See, e.g., Estate of Newcomer v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa.
1978); Francis I. Dupont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del.
Ch. 1973), affd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975).
125. The following list paraphrases some of the references to constructive ownership
in the Internal Revenue Code.
I.R.C. § 267 (2000):
Losses, Expenses, and Interest with Respect to Transactions Be-
tween Related Taxpayers.
(c)-Defines constructive ownership for the purpose of when
losses created by transactions between related taxpayers are
deductible. The shareholder is considered to own stock owned
directly or indirectly by:
(c)(1)-Corporations, partnerships, estates, or trusts where the
taxpayer is a shareholder, partner, or beneficiariy;
(c)(2)-Family;
(c)(3)-Partner;
(c)(4)-Defines family to include only brothers and sisters,
spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.
(e)-Provides special rules for partnership regarding deductibility of
losses.
(e)(3)(A)-Do not apply (c)(3) when dealing with partners.
(e)(3)(B)-Interests owned by or for a C corporation are considered
as owned by or for any shareholder that owns 5% or more in
value of the stock of the corporation.
I.R.C. § 302 (2000):
Distributions in Redemption of Stock.
(c)-Constructive ownership as applied to § 302.
(c)(1)-In general, § 318(a) definition of constructive ownership ap-
plies with exceptions in (c)(2).
(c)(2)(A)-§ 318(a)(1) does not apply to § 302(b)(3), which provides
for a stock redemption to be treated as a distribution in exchange
for the stock, and not a dividend, if: the distributee does not have
any interest in the corporation except as a creditor; the distribu-
tee does not acquire any such interest (other than stock acquired
by bequest or inheritance) within ten years from the date of dis-
tribution; and the distributee meets the filing requirements with
the Secretary.
(c)(2)(B)-Subsection (c)(2)(A) does not apply if any of the redeemed
stock was acquired, within the ten years preceding the distribu-
tion date, from a person whose ownership would be attributable
to the distributee under § 318(a).
(c)(2)(C)(ii)(II)-Defines related person for purpose of § 302(C) to
mean "any person to whom ownership of stock in the corporation
(at time of distribution) is attributable under [§] 318(a)(1) if the
stock is further attributable to the entity under [§] 318(a)(3)."
I.R.C. § 304 (2000):
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Redemption Through Use of Related Corporations.
(c)(3)-Applies § 318's constructive ownership rules for determining
by replacing the 50% limitation in § 318(a)(2)(C) and § 318(a)(3)(C)
with 5%.
I.R.C. § 318 (2000):
Constructive Ownership of Stock.
This section sets out attribution rules. The rules in subsection (a) ap-
ply to the following sections:
§ 302 (relating to redemption of stock);
§ 304 (relating to redemption by related corporations);
§ 306(b)(1)(A) (relating to disposition of § 306 stock);
§ 338(h)(3) (defining purchase);
§ 382(1)(3) (relating to special limitations on net operating loss
carryovers);
§ 856(d) (relating to definition of rents from real property in the
case of real estate investment trusts); and
§ 958(b) (relating to constructive ownership rules with respect to
certain foreign corporations).
I.R.C. § 336 (2000):
Gain or Loss Recognized on Property Distributed in Complete
Liquidation.
(d)-Prohibits recognition of loss with certain distributions to related
persons as defined by § 267.
I.R.C. § 355 (2000):
Distribution of Stock and Securities of a Controlled Corporation.
(d)(8)-Applies § 318(a)(2) in determining whether an individual owns
stock or securities in any corporation but substitutes 10% for 50%.
I.R.C. § 382 (2000):
Limitations on Net Operating Loss Carryforwards and Certain Build-
Losses Following Ownership Change.
(/)(3)(A)-Applies § 318 construction ownership rules in determining
ownership of stock with the following exceptions:
(i)-The "members of family" provisions in § 318(a)(1) and (a)(5)(B)
do not apply and an individual and all members of his family de-
scribed § 318(a)(1) are treated as a single individual.
(ii)-The 50% limitation "from operations" contained in
§ 318(a)(2)(C) does not apply and stock attributed under this sec-
tion is treated as no longer being held by the entity from which it
is attributed.
(iii)-§ 318(a)(3) (attribution to partnerships, estates, trusts, and
corporations) is applied only to the extent provided for in the
regulations.
(iv)-Deals with options.
(v)-§ 318(a)(2) (attribution from partnerships, estates, trusts, and
corporations) does not apply when:
()-The attribution is from a corporation and the stock of which
is not treated as stock under this section; or
(II)-There is a similar attribution from another entity as de-
scribed in subsection (I) above.
I.R.C. § 424 (2000):
Definitions and Special Rule (Relating to Certain Stock Options).
(d)-For applying the percentages of ownership limits in § 423(b)(3),
attributes to the individual any stock owned by "brothers and sis-
ters (whether by whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants." It also attributes ownership for shareholders, part-
ners, or beneficiaries any stock owned directly or indirectly by or for
a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust.
I.R.C. § 465 (2000):
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rules treat taxpayers as owning shares of stock actually owned by des-
ignated related parties. The rules strive to prevent transactions be-
tween related parties from being treated the same as if between
independent parties. They form part of the government's arsenal
against tax evasion.
Bittker & Eustice, both referring to the important constructive
ownership rules of § 318126 and commenting on constructive rules
generally, said:
Deductions Limited to Amount at Risk.
(b)(3)(C)-Defines "related person" for the subsection as a person hav-
ing a relationship specified in § 267(b) or § 707(b)(1) but substitut-
ing 10% for 50% in these sections. It also defines "related person"
as any such person engaged in trades or businesses under common
control as set out in § 52(a) and (b).
(b)(6)(D)-Defines "qualified person" as the same as "qualified person"
in § 49(a)(1)(D)(iv), without the part dealing with financing from re-
lated persons if the financing is commercially reasonable and on
substantially the same terms as loans involving unrelated persons.
(c)(7)(D)(iii)-Looks to § 318(a)(1) to define members of an employee's
family.
(c)(7)(E)(I)-Applies § 318(a) to the definition of"non-owner employee"
with the substitution of 5% for 50% in § 318(a)(2)(c).
(c)(7)(G)-Applies § 269(A)(b)(2) and substitutes 5% for 10% in that
section.
I.R.C. § 512 (2000):
Unrelated Business Taxable Income.
(b)(13)(D)(ii)-Applies § 318 constructive ownership rules.
I.R.C. § 542 (2000):
Definition of Personal Holding Company.
(d)(2)(A)-Disallows deductions in respect to compensation of personal
services rendered by shareholders, which includes members of the
shareholder's family as described in § 544(a)(2).
I.R.C. § 544 (2000):
Rules for Determining Stock Ownership.
(a)(1)-(6)-Provides special attribution rules for personal holding
company.
I.R.C. § 707 (2000):
Transactions Between Partner and Partnership.
(b)(3)-Applies the constructive ownership rules in § 267(c), except for
subsection (c)(3), which would attribute a partner's stock according
to § 707(b)(1) and (2).
I.R.C. § 958 (2000):
Rules for Determining Stock Ownership.
(b)-Relating to constructive ownership rules with respect to certain
foreign corporations.
I.R.C. § 1563 (2000):
Definitions and Special Rules.
(e)-Constructive ownership rules relating consolidated returns and
resulting from options, attribution from partnerships, estate or
trusts, corporations, spouses, children (minor, adult, and adopted),
grandchildren, parents, and grandparents.
(f)(2)-Stock constructively owned through spouse, children,
grandchildren, parents, and grandparents cannot be attributed
twice.
126. I.R.C. § 318 (2000).
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Intricately devised, § 318 is only one of several sets of constructive ownership
rules prescribed by the Code, which rules differ among themselves in such
details as the degree of family relationship warranting the attribution of stock
from one person to another and in the way stock owned by a trust is allocated
to its beneficiaries. Although in theory each set could be crafted to suit the
transaction to which it applies, their divergencies are frequently trivial and
almost always inexplicable.1
2 7
The application of constructive ownership rules usually is negative for
the taxpayers. When applicable, the rules tend to take away favorable
tax consequences.
The constructive ownership rules of § 318 and their application to
the § 302(b)128 redemption rules illustrate. The § 302(b) redemption
rules follow general themes of corporate tax law. If a stock redemp-
tion diminishes the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration, the shareholder is cashing in, at least partly, on her
investment and recognizes a capital gain or loss. If the redemption
does not diminish her proportionate interest in the corporation, the
shareholder is not cashing in. Instead, she is extracting cash from the
corporation. This is a disguised § 301 distribution and is a dividend to
the extent the corporation has earnings. For example, suppose that
Barfie is a 100% shareholder of a corporation with $500 in earnings
and profits. If the corporation redeems 25% of Barfie's stock for $50,
Barfie is still a 100% shareholder of that corporation. That $50 pay-
ment is identical to a dividend and will be treated that way.
Section 302 is the key section. Under § 302(a),1 29 if the redemp-
tion meets any of the tests in § 302(b), the redeemed shareholder is
entitled to sale or exchange treatment. The shareholder recognizes a
capital gain or loss as if she sold the stock. However, under
§ 302(d),130 if the redemption fails to meet any of § 302(b)'s tests, the
redemption proceeds are treated as a § 301 distribution, meaning a
dividend and ordinary income for the shareholder. Section 302(b) con-
tains four tests: § 302(b)(1), § 302(b)(2), and § 302(b)(3) all require a
reduction in the redeemed shareholder's percentage of stock owner-
ship. 131 Section 302(b)(4)132 requires a partial liquidation of the cor-
poration and is not relevant to this discussion.
Section 302(c)(1) 133 requires the application of § 318's constructive
ownership rules in determining the percentage of stock ownership for
the first three § 302(b) tests. In measuring a redeemed shareholder's
percentage of stock ownership, both before and after redemption, the
127. 1 BirTER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, [ 9.02[11] (citations omitted).
128. I.R.C. § 302(b) (2000).
129. Id. § 302(a).
130. Id. § 302(d).
131. Id. § 302(b)(1)-(3).
132. Id. § 302(b)(4).
133. Id. § 302(c)(1). The rules are sometimes called "attribution" rules. For instance
one rule attributes stock owned by a husband to a wife. Id. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i).
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shareholder is deemed to constructively own the following: any stock
actually owned by designated family members; any stock actually
owned by entities in which the shareholder has an interest; and any
stock on which the redeemed shareholder holds an option.134 If the
redeeming shareholder is an entity, and not a human, it construc-
tively owns shares actually owned by certain parties with interests in
it. For instance, a trust constructively owns shares actually owned by
its beneficiaries.13 5 Suppose the following:
X Corp has 100 shares;
Husband (H) owns 40 shares;
Wife (W) owns 10 shares; and
Wife, Inc. (owned solely by W) owns 50 shares.
X Corp redeems 25 of H's 40 shares. H's percentage of stock owner-
ship diminished from 40% before the redemption (40 of 100 shares) to
25% after the redemption (15 of 60 shares). Without application of
constructive ownership rules, H's diminution in percentage ownership
will satisfy the disproportionate redemption test of § 302(b)(2).136
Since the redemption of H's shares would satisfy one of the § 302(b)
tests, H would avoid ordinary income from a dividend and would be
entitled to a capital gain (or loss). But the constructive ownership
rules would have to be applied as follows:
(1) By dint of the family attribution rule contained in
§ 318(a)(1)(A)(i), Ws shares are attributed to H, her spouse,
because a person constructively owns shares actually owned
by the spouse.
(2) By dint of entity-to-owner attribution rules contained in
§ 318(a)(2)(C),137 Wife Inc.'s shares are attributed to the
sole shareholder W, because a shareholder constructively
owns shares actually or constructively owned by her
corporation.
(3) By dint the family attribution rule contained in
§ 318(a)(1)(A)(i),138 the shares constructively owned by W
are reattributed to her spouse H, because a person construc-
tively owns stock actually or constructively owned by the
spouse.
So what percentage of stock does H own before the redemption?
The answer is 100%-his own 40 shares actually; and W's 10 shares
and Wife Inc.'s 50 shares constructively. What percentage of stock
does H own after the redemption? He still owns 100%, for the same
134. Id. § 318(a)(1).
135. Id. § 318(a)(3).
136. Id. § 302(b)(2).
137. Id. § 318(a)(2)(c).
138. Id. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i).
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reasons. Thus, none of the § 302(b) tests requiring diminution in the
shareholder's percentage of stock ownership are met. 139 He owned
100% both before and after the redemption, due to application of the
constructive ownership rules. Hence, payment of the redemption pro-
ceeds are treated as a § 301 distribution to him and ordinary income
to the extent of the redeeming corporation's earnings.
The previous discussion of the § 318 attribution rules, of course, is
by no means complete. In Corporate Tax I, our class spends two full
fifty-minute classes covering the key points. One issue-whether to
waive family attribution rules in a redemption that completely termi-
nates a shareholder's interest-has so many points and counterpoints
that Bittker & Eustice likens the rules to a "baroque fugue."140 This
provides some relief in class. We take a five minute break from our
work to discuss whatever a "fugue" is. Usually, most of us do not
know, but occasionally a classical music enthusiast tries to enlighten
us. 141
Although, the § 318 rules may be more elaborate than is necessary,
they generally make sense. For example, a person constructively
owns stock actually owned by a spouse or parent; but, a cut-off rule
prevents that shareholder from constructively owning stock really
owned by a mother-in-law or father-in-law.142 One could object to the
rule for giving adverse weight to certain transactions taking place as
much as ten years before the redemption,14 3 but ten years is just a
little overkill. Without the constructive ownership rules, shareholders
could extract cash from the corporation and easily avoid unwanted
dividend treatment through redemptions involving related parties.
139. Id. § 302(b)(l)-(3).
140. 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 9.04[3].
141. In music, "baroque" refers to "a style of composition that flourished in Europe
from about 1600 to 1750, marked by expressive dissonance and elaborate orna-
mentation." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
146 (4th ed. 2000). "Fugue" is "an imitative polyphonic composition in which a
theme or themes are stated successively in all of the voices of the contrapuntal
structure." Id. at 709. This definition was not much help to us in class, because
most of us did not know the meaning of "polyphonic" and "contrapuntal." "Poly-
phonic" is the adjective for "polyphony," which means "music with two or more
independent melodic parts sounded together." Id. at 1361. "Contrapuntal" refers
to music that incorporates counterpoints. Id. at 399. Is Handel's Hallelujah Cho-
rus a fugue? Bach is known for his fugues.
142. Section 318(a)(1)(A) applies the constructive ownership rules to spouses and par-
ents but does not include in-laws. Section 318(a)(5) prevents application of the
family attribution rules twice, which would be necessary to make a shareholder
the constructive owner of stock owned by a mother-in-law. Without § 318(a)(5),
stock owned by the mother-in-law would be attributed to her child under
§ 318(a)(1)(A)(ii) and thus to the child's spouse under § 318(a)(1)(A)(i).
143. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(i).
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Yet the various sets of constructive ownership rules in the Code
contain bizarre and ridiculous differences. For example, § 267(a) 14 4
disallows losses on sales and exchanges between specified related par-
ties. Section 267(c)(4) 14 5 defines related parties, including certain
family members. This time family includes "brothers and sisters,
whether by the whole or half blood, spouse, ancestors, and lineal de-
scendants."146 Section 544(a)(2), 14 7 which provides constructive own-
ership rules for the diabolical definition of a personal holding
company, likewise includes brothers and sisters. The § 318 rules do
not include brothers or sisters and are otherwise different than these
other sections.148
Is there a legitimate, or even a plausible, reason for including sib-
lings in one set of rules and not in another? Are siblings more likely to
coordinate their tax avoidance efforts in personal holding companies
than when having their stock redeemed in closely-held corporations?
Maybe yes, maybe no, but the issue seems like asking, "how high is
up?"
VI. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES AND THEIR UNPRINCIPLED
DIFFERENCES UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAW
In 1996, I published an article entitled Passthrough Entities and
Their Unprincipled Differences Under Federal Tax Law. 14 9 In that ar-
ticle, I noted that choosing the best form of organization for a business
is daunting, because it requires an analysis of the tax consequences of
operating as a C corporation, an S corporation, a general partnership,
a limited partnership, and a limited liability company. While writing
that article, the Treasury Department proposed a new system in No-
tice 95-10, called "Check-the-Box."'150 To a degree, the new system
has cleaned up the problems relating to having so many systems for
taxing the income of a business enterprise. By using a limited liability
company, business enterprise owners can now attain limited liability
and passthrough tax consequences without fulfilling the subchapter S
corporation eligibility requirements. Moreover, the passthrough-type
partnership tax consequences, offered by limited liability companies,
are often more desirable than those accompanying subchapter S sta-
tus. Nevertheless, the alternatives "facing the business lawyer [have]
144. Id. § 267(a).
145. Id. § 267(c)(4).
146. Id. § 267(b)(1).
147. Id. § 544(a)(2).
148. Id. § 318(a)(1).
149. William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences
Under Federal Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15 (1995) [hereinafter Rands, Pass-
through Entities].
150. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
[Vol. 83:39
CORPORATE TAX
become varied, to the point of almost being bewildering .... Adding
the federal income tax classification options yields twenty-three
possibilities."151
Despite pundits' professed infatuation with limited liability compa-
nies and their attendant partnership taxation, new incorporations
abound; and, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the S corporation is
showing surprising vitality. In 1997, for the first time, a majority of
corporate tax returns were filed by S corporations.1 52 It is estimated
that S corporations will be the fastest growing type of business tax
entity through 2005.153 Why not a mad rush to limited liability com-
panies? Why the continuing popularity of the S corporation? Perhaps
it is inertia. Supchapter S has been in place since 1958, and some
practitioners may feel comfortable with it. It is easier to stick with the
tried and true. Undoubtedly, some practitioners and several business
owners may be ignorant of the advantages of passthrough/partnership
taxation over subchapter S. Maybe it is that partnership taxation is
far more complex than S corporation taxation. The added complexity
may outweigh the benefit, especially for simple business structures
that may have no need for the other benefits of partnership tax law.
Not everyone needs to make the § 704154 special allocations. Further-
more, following what may be somewhat dubious advice, many busi-
ness owners seem to be using the S form to avoid paying payroll taxes
by denominating payments to themselves as dividends rather than
compensation.155 Additionally, some S corporations already in exis-
tence probably want to preserve S status because there is a tax cost in
transferring assets out of the corporation.156
To be competent, a tax planner still must master the differences
between partnerships covered by subchapter K and corporations cov-
ered by subchapter S. The planner also must know the intricacies of
the ever-complex subchapter C. As an American Law Institute study
recently stated:
151. William H. Clark, Jr., Rationalizing Entity Laws, 58 Bus. LAw. 1005, 1006
(2003).
152. STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TAXATION:
CASES & MATERIALS 14 (5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter LIND 2002].
153. Id.
154. I.R.C. § 704 (2000).
155. See Fred R. Esser, P.C. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. (D. Ariz. 1990); Davis v.
United States, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5618 (D. Colo. 1994); Radtke v. United States,
712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989), affd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.); see also, A.
Bruce Clements & Paul J. Streer, How Low Can Owner-Employee Compensation
Be Set to Save on Employee Taxes?, 2 J. S CORP TAX'N 37 (1990); Burgess J.W.
Raby & William L. Raby, New Incentives for Avoiding SE and FICA Tax, 81 TAX
NOTES 1389 (1998); Dale W. Spradling, Are S Corp. Distributions Wages Subject
to Withholding?, 71 J. TAX'N 104 (1989).
156. Rands, Passthrough Entities, supra note 149, at 37.
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If the three sets of rules produced more or less the same tax consequences in
most situations, the choice among them might not be especially significant.
But that is not the case. In any given situation, subchapter C, K or S may
provide an advantageous tax result for particular taxpayers. 157
There is no pat answer as to which form is the best. And this does not
even take into account specialized rules for conduits that some people
need to know, like subchapter M for mutual funds and real estate in-
vestment trusts, subchapter L for insurance companies, subchapter H
for banks and trusts companies, and subchapter F for tax exempt or-
ganizations and cooperatives.
As I argued in my earlier article, Congress should establish uni-
form rules for all conduits with respect to both tax consequences and
eligibility requirements. Numerous proposals have been made to
change this byzantine system,158 and Congress should carefully parse
through them and adopt some changes. There are far too many ab-
struse differences between subchapter K and subchapter S, even
though the basic system for each of them is so similar.
VII. "ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST"'59:
REORGANIZATIONS
Section 368(a)(1) contains a list of transactions known as reorgani-
zations1 60 ("reorgs" for those of us in the know). Reorgs are transac-
tions involving exchanges that, according to basic tax principles,
157. GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SnAKow, Am. LAw INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRO-
JECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRSES: REPORTERS' STUDY 42 (1999)
[hereinafter YIN & SHAKow, REPORTERS' STUDY].
158. See H.R. 22, 108th Cong. (2003), which would establish a uniform passthrough
entity regime. The proposed bill would combine the benefits of subchapter S and
partnerships in a single system based on subchapter K. Closely held, domestic
corporations could choose partnership status for federal tax. Subchapter S would
be repealed. A 1999 American Law Institute report recommended that "all pri-
vate business firms, no matter what their form of organization and organiza-
tional characteristics, (should be] taxed as conduits for income-tax purposes" with
tax liability passing through to the individual owners. YIN & SnAKow, REPORT-
ERS' STUDY, supra note 157, at 1. It recommends retaining subchapter S and sub-
chapter K (partnership rules) but with specific proposals for changes in both of
them. See id.; see also George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business
Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 141 (1999).
159. KEN KESEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1962). Kesey (1935-2001) was
somewhat of a 1960s counterculture hero and guru. He was also a central figure
in a nonfiction book about early hippies and LSD. TOM WOLFE, ELECTRIC KOOL-
AID ACID TEST (1968). One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest became a play and a
famous 1975 movie, starring Jack Nicholson. It won numerous Academy awards
including best picture, director, actor, actress, and screen play. Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, The Official Academy Awards Database, at
http://www.oscars.org/awardsdatabase/.
160. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)-(G) (2000).
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would be taxable events. 161 However, for policy reasons Congress de-
cided the exchange should not be taxable. Reorgs are made "tax free."
The various parties are given "nonrecognition." Why? The theoretical
underpinning is that the transactions are mere changes in form. 162
Sometimes,163 but not always,164 this is accurate. In addition to the-
ory, there is an underlying policy supporting tax free status. Congress
has chosen not to impede the salutary readjustments of corporate
structures necessary in a capitalistic society.165
The Bittker & Eustice text politely calls the reorganization rules
"extraordinarily complex, even for the Code."166 They are also crazy.
The craziness is amply illustrated by the rules for acquisitive reorga-
nizations, transactions whereby one corporation acquires the assets or
the stock of another corporation. Section 368 lists five acquisition
techniques.167 They are:
(1) A merger of a target into an acquiring corporation (called an
"A" reorganization because it is listed in § 368(a)(1)(A));
(2) An acquiring corporation using its voting stock to acquire
stock of the target corporation (called a "B" reorganization
because it is listed in § 368(a)(1)(B));
(3) An acquiring corporation using its voting stock to acquire
substantially all of the assets of the target corporation
(called a "C" reorganization because it is listed in
§ 368(a)(1)(C));
(4) A forward triangular merger, which is a merger of a target
corporation into a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation
with the target shareholders taking some acquiring corpora-
tion stock (authorized by § 368(a)(2)(D)); and
(5) A reverse triangular merger, which is a merger of a subsidi-
ary of the acquiring corporation into the target corporation
with the acquiring corporation obtaining a controlling block
161. The regulations provide "except as otherwise provided ... the gain or loss real-
ized ... from the exchange of property for other property ... is treated as income
or loss sustained." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1996).
162. See, e.g., Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); 1 BrIrKER & EUSTICE, supra note
17, 12.01[3].
163. For example, "F" reorganizations are mere changes in identity, form, or state of
incorporation. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F). Obviously, such transactions are not true re-
alization events.
164. A merger of a small, closely held corporation into a large, publicly-traded corpora-
tion is an "A" reorganization, provided the shareholders in the closely held corpo-
ration receive some of the publicly held corporation's stock. The merger is
scarcely a mere change in form for the shareholders of the closely held corpora-
tion. See 1 BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 1201[2].
165. See, e.g., S. REP. 67-275 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B., 181, 188-89. This
report is noted in LIND 2002, supra note 152, at 405, 405 n.3.
166. 1 BIrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 12.01[4].
167. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)-(2).
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of the stock of the target corporation and the original share-
holders of the target taking the acquiring corporation's vot-
ing stock (authorized by § 368(a)(2)(E)).16 8
The end result in both the "A" and "C" reorg is the same:169 the
target corporation no longer exists; the acquiring corporation owns
some or all of the target's assets; and at least some of the targets
shareholders own stock in the acquirer. In the "B" reorg and the re-
verse triangular merger reorg, the target stays in existence but be-
comes a subsidiary of the acquirer, and the target's shareholders own
stock of the acquirer. "A" and "C" reorgs followed by a drop-down of
the acquired assets to a subsidiary have exactly the same end result
as the "B" and reverse triangular merger reorgs. The result of the
forward triangular merger reorg is different from the "B" and the re-
verse triangle merger, but only in a formal way-the target no longer
exists because it has merged into a subsidiary of the acquirer. How-
ever, this subsidiary is virtually identical to the target, as it must own
substantially all of the target's assets. Triangular "C" reorgs have the
same end result as the "A" and "C" reorgs with a drop-down, the "B"
reorg, and the reverse triangular merger reorg.
Intrinsically, of course, the form of the acquisition technique
makes no difference. The acquiring company can acquire the target
by acquiring all of its assets or all of its stock. It does not matter
whether it acquires its assets through a merger or by a direct
purchase. It does not matter whether it holds the assets directly or
drops them down to a subsidiary. If the acquiring corporation ac-
quires a target's stock, it does not matter whether it acquires it in a
direct purchase, a forward triangular merger, or a reverse triangular
merger. No matter which acquisition technique is used, the end result
is economically the same. The acquirer has acquired the target and
now owns it.
Despite the economic equivalence of these acquisition techniques,
the tax law has distinctive, nitpicking rules for each kind of acquisi-
tion technique. Though this is very good for providing employment for
tax professionals, most importantly law professors, it makes no sense.
168. The listing in the text does not include triangular "B" and "C" reorganizations,
where the subsidiary of the acquiring corporation acquires the stock or substan-
tially all of the assets of the target corporation respectively. See id.
§ 368(a)(1)(B)-(C). These techniques are not substantially different from the reg-
ular "B" and "C" reorganizations. The Code also allows the acquiring corporation
to drop down whatever it receives to its own subsidiary without disqualifying the
transaction as a reorganization. Id. § 368(a)(2)(C).
169. The Code requires the target corporation selling its assets in a "C" reorganization
to liquidate after the sale. Id. § 368(a)(2)(F)(i). The liquidation puts the target
out of existence. The Internal Revenue Service can waive the liquidation require-
ment. Id. § 368(a)(2)(F)(ii).
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There is not enough room in this Article to describe all the different
rules, but here is one for purposes of illustration.
Each of the five primary acquisition techniques has its own re-
quirements for the type of consideration that the acquirer must use to
pay for the acquisition. The "A" reorg has the most lenient rules.
They are not in the Internal Revenue Code but instead come from the
common law and the regulations.170 To qualify as an "A" reorg, tar-
get shareholders must be paid at least partly with acquiring corpora-
tion stock. It need not be common stock or voting stock. It can be
nonvoting preferred stock.171 This requirement is called continuity of
interest and, sometimes, continuity of proprietary interest. Though
the Internal Revenue Service will rule privately that this requirement
is met if at least 50% of the consideration paid to the target sharehold-
ers is the acquirer's stock,172 ancient cases provide the real bench-
mark. Twenty-five percent voting common stock is enough.173 Thirty-
eight percent redeemable, nonvoting preferred is enough.174 Sixteen
percent voting common stock is not.175 A more recent case inferred
that 22% voting common stock is not enough.176 Acquirers should feel
comfortable that the requirement is satisfied by using 25% common
stock. Seventy-five percent of the consideration can come from other
sources, such as cash, to pay the target shareholders in the merger.
The Internal Revenue Code prescribes the consideration require-
ments for "B" and "C" reorgs. The "B" reorg rule is simple. The ac-
quirer can use only its own voting stock to pay for the acquisition.177
The "C" reorg rules are fairly complicated and there really is not
enough room to discuss them in complete detail here. Section
368(a)(1)(C)178 states that acquirer can use solely its own voting stock
(in language identical to the rule for "B" reorgs in § 368(a)(1)(B)), but
in actuality, this is inaccurate. Section 368(a)(2)(D)(i)179 allows the
acquirer to use other forms of consideration and still have a "C" reorg,
provided that acquirer uses enough of its own voting stock to pay for
80% of the fair market value of the target's assets.18 0 This rule allows
170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)-(c) (as amended in 2001). The continuity of interest
requirements developed in a series of cases in the 1930s. See Helvering v. Minn.
Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374
(1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland
Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932).
171. John A. Nelson Co., 296 U.S. 374.
172. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
173. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1936).
174. John A. Nelson Co., 296 U.S. 374.
175. Kass v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 218 (1973).
176. J.E. Seagram Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 75 (1995).
177. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2000).
178. Id. § 368(a)(1)(C).
179. Id. § 368(a)(2)(D)(i).
180. Id. § 368(a)(2)(B).
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the acquirer to use consideration other than its own voting stock in an
amount up to 20% of the fair market value of all the target's assets, if
the acquirer buys 100% of the target's assets and it takes on no target
liabilities.
In a much-watched case, a taxpayer argued that the acquirer ought
to be able to use consideration other than its own voting stock in a "B"
reorg if it uses its own voting stock to acquire 80% or more of the tar-
get's stock. This argument did win in several lower courts.18 1 How-
ever, unlike for "C" reorgs, the Internal Revenue Code does not have a
section allowing for this leniency in "B" reorgs. At the circuit court
level the argument was rejected,18 2 and the law now seems settled.
Thus, "B" reorgs require using acquirer voting stock exclusively as the
consideration. Conversely, "C" reorgs require using acquirer voting
stock primarily, but sometimes allow for a little boot.
For the most part, forward triangular merger reorgs follow the le-
nient consideration rules for "A" reorgs.18 3 The subsidiary, which
technically is the acquiring corporation, must use enough of the par-
ent's stock to satisfy the continuity of proprietary interest require-
ment. Just as if the transaction was an "A" reorg between the parent
and the target, the consideration needs to consist of merely 25% par-
ent stock. Seventy-five percent boot or cash is allowed. The 25% stock
component must be the stock of the subsidiary's parent. According to
a very odd rule in the Code, the subsidiary cannot use any of its own
stock and still satisfy the forward triangular merger reorg section.
18 4
Section 368(a)(2)(E)(ii)18 5 provides the consideration requirements
for a reverse triangular reorg. They are different than all of the other
consideration rules. The acquirer must obtain at least 80% of the tar-
get's stock in one transaction and pay with enough of its own voting
stock to equal at least 80% of the value of the target's stock. For ex-
ample, if the acquirer obtains 90% of the target's stock in a merger of
the acquirer's subsidiary into the target, eight-ninths of the considera-
tion paid by the acquirer must consist of its voting stock. One-ninth of
the consideration can be anything else, such as cash. This somewhat
resembles the consideration rule in the Code for "C" reorgs.
All in all, there are five consideration rules for the five basic types
of acquisition reorgs, even though all five types of reorgs have the
181. Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del 1979); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
United States, 403 F. Supp. 498, 509 n.21 (D. Conn. 1975); Reeves v. Comm'r, 71
T.C. 727, 741 (1979); Mills v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 393 (1962).
182. Chapman v. Comm'r, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980).
183. Section 368(a)(2)(D)(ii) says that the transaction must qualify under the "A" reorg
rules. This means that the forward triangular must meet the continuity of pro-
prietary interest rules for "A" reorgs. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(2) (as amended
in 2003); 1 BiTrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 17, 12.25[4].
184. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D)(i).
185. Id. § 368(a)(2)(E)(ii).
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same basic economic result-one corporation acquiring another corpo-
ration. These variances are the result of the incremental and piece-
meal nature of change in corporate tax. They are not supported by
policy or theory.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I conclude with recommendations on how to eliminate some of this
"agony" in corporate tax.
A. Dovetailing
Congress should dovetail new legislation with the current code.
This is an obvious point, but Congress has not always done it. An
example is noted earlier in this paper: § 361(c)(2)(B)(i) allows a corpo-
ration to distribute any debt of the corporation (called "obligations")
tax free in a "D" reorganization corporate division, while § 355(c)(2)(B)
limits tax free treatment in a non"D" reorganization division to long-
term debts (called "securities"). Both should use either the word "obli-
gations" as does § 361(c)(2)(B)(i) or the word "securities" as does
§ 355(c)(2)(B)(i). It would be understandable if the dovetailing is done
in a technical corrections act, but it is hard to see why it cannot be
done.
B. Control Tests
There are far too many control tests. Congress should synthesize
them into two basic tests: an 80% test and a 50% test. In some in-
stances there may be solid policy reasons for retaining or adopting
tests other than the two basic tests, but probably not very often. The
new tests could be placed in § 7701,186 which contains numerous defi-
nitions. Though I personally dislike value tests for their inexactitude,
there often are good reasons for them. Why not have all the value
tests require the appropriate percentage of both the voting power of
the corporation and the value of all of the stock of the corporation?
C. Constructive Ownership Rules
Congress should synthesize all of the constructive ownership rules
into one rule, which could be placed into § 7701. Again, if there are
solid policy reasons for a rule different than the new basic rule in
§ 7701, then by all means, Congress should formulate a different rule.
However, corporate tax law can be much simplified by switching to
one basic rule to be applied most, if not all, of the time. After all, why
include siblings for some rules but not for others?




Congress should settle on one set of eligibility requirements and
one set of tax consequences for passtrough entities. Currently, a lim-
ited liability company can have a nonresident alien as an owner, but
an S corporation cannot. A partner can add entity-level debt to his
basis, but an S shareholder cannot. These distinctions do not make
sense. More importantly, the law of federal taxation of business orga-
nizations can be greatly simplified by settling on a single set of stan-
dard rules. Simplicity is especially desirable in this context, because
choice of business form is such a common issue-and one that is often
confronted by people who lack expertise in tax law.
E. Reorganizations
This is an area that was ripe for reform even upon adoption of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which contains a majority of the rules
still in the Code. Short of fundamental reform, there is at least one
change that would greatly reduce the complexity of our current byzan-
tine system. That would be to decide on a uniform consideration re-
quirement for every type of acquisitive reorganization. L8 7 It makes no
sense for each form of acquisition to have a distinctive rule for the type
of consideration that the acquiring corporation must use to achieve a
tax free transaction. In some instances, the requirements are wildly
different: 25% common stock and 75% other consideration is accept-
able in a merger ("A" reorganization rules); but 100% voting stock is
required in stock acquisition ("B" reorganization rules). Settle on one
rule!
187. See SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., REFORM OF THE TAXATION OF MERGERS, ACQUISI-
TIONS AND LBO's 12-21 (1993).
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